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According to John Holdren, the Science Advisor to President
Obama, humanity can only respond to climate change in three ways.
We can mitigate climate change, for example by reducing greenhouse
gas emissions; we can adapt to climate change, for example by
defending our coastlines; or we can suffer from climate change.'
* Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law, and
Member Scholar of the Center for Progressive Reform. This Article was written prior to
the negotiations that resulted in the Copenhagen Accord and for the most part does not
reflect the outcome of those negotiations.
1 John P. Holdren. Meeting the Climate-Change Challenge, Eighth Annual John H.
Chafee Memorial Lecture on Science and the Environment, Jan. 17, 2008, at 5, available
at http://www.ncseonline.org/Conference/Chafee08final.pdf; see also Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Working Group 1. Contributionof Working Group I to
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Given current emission levels and projected climate change impacts,
we are inevitably going to do some of all three. A human rights
approach, the subject of this Article, puts the focus on those who will
suffer from climate change, in the hopes of building the political will
to compel humanity to put more resources into both adapting and
mitigating climate change.
If left unaddressed, climate change will have significant and
adverse impacts on the quality of human life; many observers now
discuss those impacts in human rights terms. 2 In general, climate
change threatens the achievement of sustainable levels of
development necessary for the fulfillment of economic, social, and
cultural rights. In particular, climate change impacts have been linked
to the right to life,3 the right to health,4 the right to adequate food,5 the
right to adequate water,6 the right to housing,7 and the right to selfthe Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 18
(2007), available at http://www.uclm.es/area/amf/Antoine/Fusion/Ipcc anotado.pdf
[hereinafter IPCC 2007: Physical Science Basis].
2 See. e.g.. Submission of the Maldives to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights and Climate Change (Sept. 25, 2008)
available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Maldives/MaldivesSubmission_29Sep08
.pdf [hereinafter Maldives Submission]; John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human
Rights Law 50 VA. J. INTL L. (forthcoming 2009); Siobhfin Mclnemey-Lankford, Climate
Change and Human Rights: An Introduction to Legal Issues, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
431 (2009): Amy Sinden. Climate Change and Human Rights. 27 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 255 (2007); Sara C. Aminzadeh, A Moral Imperative: The Human Rights
Implications of Climate Change, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 231 (2007);
SVITLANA KRAVCHENKCO & JOHN E. BONINE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
CASES, LAW, AND POLICY 549 96 (2008); CHRIS WOLD, DAVID HUNTER & MELISSA
POWERS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 426-41 (2009).

3 Climate change may impair the right to life because the increasing intensity of
hurricanes, droughts, and other severe weather events may increase the loss of life due to
natural disasters. Some tropical diseases may also spread as a result of global warming,
leading to loss of life. U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Annual Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the
High Commissioner and the Secretary General, 21 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 10/61 (Jan.
15, 2009) [hereinafter OH-CHR Report]; Maldives Submission, supra note 2, at 42-45.
4 0HCHR Report, supra note 3,
31 34; Maldives Submission, supra note 2, at 53
54.
5 Climate change has implications for a right to food because changes in local and
regional climate will change local agricultural conditions. In some cases, centuries of
traditional knowledge of how to grow crops in specific areas will be obsolete. Increased
droughts and desertification will also reduce yields in many areas. In addition to these
direct impacts, certain climate change mitigation policies (most notably reliance on
growing biofuels for energy) may impact food prices and availability. OHCHR Report,
supra note 3, 1 25-27: Maldives Submission. supra note 2, at 48-51.
6 Climate change will have an impact on States' ability to fulfill the right to water.
Increasing droughts and floods, particularly declining snow packs, will result in less water
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determination. 8 Climate change's impacts on human rights are not
going to be equally felt; the rights of the poor, of politically
marginalized communities and groups, and of future generations, are
particularly at risk.9
How we respond to climate change may also give rise to human
rights violations, and a rights-based approach might assist us in
prioritizing among otherwise equivalent responses. For example,
many biofuels are less attractive alternatives when viewed from the
perspective of their impact on food prices and the right to food.'"
In the past few years, the increasingly clear human rights
implications of climate change have led many observers to explore
how to bring human rights law and institutions to bear on the climate
issue.'' In some instances, human rights have been seen as providing
a basis for litigation or direct advocacy.' 2 For example, the Inuit
being available for basic human needs throughout the world. Most acutely affected will be
areas already suffering from desertification, such as the American Southwest, or areas in
which a large number of people rely on a relatively few number of water bodies. OHCHR
Report, supra note 3,
28-30: Maldives Submission. supra note 2, at 54-56.
7 Particularly as climate change exacerbates natural disasters like droughts, hurricanes,
and floods, more people will be pushed from their homes. This interferes with their right
to housing. Additionally, the right to housing implies a right to be provided shelter that
meets basic hygiene needs during disasters. Many countries. particularly developing
countries, will be increasingly stressed in ensuring that their populations have their right to
housing satisfied. OHCHR Report, supra note 3,
35 38; Maldives Submission, supra
note 2. at 51-52.
8 See generally OHCHR Report, supra note 3.
39-41. The Inuit petition alleged,
among other things, that the impact of climate change on the way of life of the Inuit will
decimate their culture and destroy their right to self determination. Petition to the Inter
American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from
Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, at 35-67, 94
(submitted by Sheila Watt-Cloutier) (Dec. 7, 2005), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/ICC
Petition 7DecO5.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Petition]. The same threat is posed to island
cultures as whole countries may be inundated as early as the next few decades. See Neil
MacFarquhar, Refugees Join List of Climate-ChangeIssues, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at
A4 (discussing the impact of climate change on island communities).
9 See Wolfgang Sachs, Climate Change andHuman Rights. 106 PONTIFICAL ACAD. OF
ScI. 349 (2006).
10 See infra text accompanying notes 98-102 (discussing biofuels).
II See generally Maldives Submission, supra note 2: Knox, supra note 2; MclnerneyLankford. supra note 2: John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the
United Nations, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2009).
12 See, e.g.. Inuit Petition. supra note 8: Maldives Submission. supra note 2; see Amy
Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security From Climate Change: The Case Against

Gas Flaring in Nigeria, in

ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND

INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 173 (William C.G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009).
But see Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and InternationalHuman Rights Litigation: A
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people of Alaska filed a human rights-based claim to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, alleging that climate
change was affecting their way of life.' 3 Others, such as small island
states, have invoked human rights discourse in the U.N. human rights
system to highlight the connections between climate change and
violations of fundamental economic, social, and cultural rights. 14 Part
I of this Article describes these and other processes that have
explicitly tried to link human rights to climate change.
That climate change is related to a variety of human rights by itself
begs the more important question of: so what? What are the
implications of using a rights-based approach to addressing climate
change?
To be sure, most of the international climate change
negotiations have focused on establishing a global policy approach that
will lead to a "safe" level of greenhouse gas concentrations at a low
cost. The policies and approaches promoted through the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC are designed not to vindicate the
rights of those affected by climate change, but rather to manage the
problem through a series of complex policy prescriptions, most notably
the carbon market created by the Kyoto Protocol. This technocratic
response to climate change is consistent with the general approach to
managing complex environmental problems through political
compromise, cost-benefit analysis, and risk management-as opposed
to a system based on legal liability, compensation for loss, or the
protection of fundamental rights.' 5
Part II of this Article explores some of the implications of taking
such a rights-based approach to climate change, recognizing that the
implications extend well beyond issues of legal responsibility to the
impact of including new voices, institutions, and expertise in the
climate debate. Even if legal remedies for climate change-related
human rights prove elusive, a rights-based perspective can inform a
Critical Appraisal, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1925 (2007) (arguing that human rights litigation
would result in poor climate change policy).
13See Martin Wagner & Donald M. Goldberg. Center for International Environmental
Law [CIEL] & Earthjustice, An Inuit Petition to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights for Dangerous Impacts of Climate Change (2004), http://www.ciel.org/
Publications/C OP 10 Handout EJCIEL.pdf.
14 See Knox, supra note 2; MALE' DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF
GLOBAL

CLIMATE

CHANGE

(2007),

http://www.manystrong

voices.org/ res/site/file/

Background%20docs/Male Declaration Nov07.pdf [hereinafter MALE' DECLARATION]:
Maldives Submission, supra note 2.
15 See, e.g.. HuMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E.

Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996).

2009]

Human Rights Implicationsfor
Climate Change Negotiations

335

re-prioritization of policy responses to climate change away from one
focused solely on carbon accounting and toward one that considers
more fully principles of equity, fairness, and the impact on the most
vulnerable.
I
LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS TO CLIMATE CHANGE

A growing number of human rights-based strategies have emerged
with respect to climate change. Many of these have been led by nongovernmental
organizations
(NGOs)
representing
affected
communities or trying more generally to achieve policy coherence
between the twin goals of promoting human rights and reducing the
impacts of climate change.
The Center for International
Environmental Law (CIEL), for example, has published a series of
human rights and climate change case studies and has supported both
the Inuit in bringing their claim to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Maldives in filing their submission to the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the
16
human rights and climate change.
relationship between
International organizations have also highlighted the human rights
implications of climate change. The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), for example, highlighted the impact of climate
change on development and associated human rights.' The following
sections focus on two efforts that have perhaps garnered the most
attention: the Inuit petition before the Inter-American Commission
and the small island states' efforts in the U.N. Council on Human
Rights.
A. The Inuit Petition to the Inter-American Commission
In 2005, the unique dependence of the Inuit people on the Arctic
environment led them to submit a petition to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights to highlight the impact of global
16 See C1EL, http://www.ciel.org/Climate/programclimate.html (describing CIEL's
climate change program); CIEL, http://www.ciel.org/Climate/Climate Impacts.html
(providing CIEL case studies on the human rights impacts of climate change): see also
World Wildlife Fund. http://www.panda.org/about our earth/aboutcc/problems/people at
risk/personalstories/witness stories (collecting individual studies of how culture change
is affecting the lives of rural farmers and others).
17 See U.N. Development Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report
200712008: Fighting Climate Change. Human Solidarity in a Divided World (2008).
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008 EN Complete.pdf.
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warming on their culture, livelihoods, and survival.18 In an innovative
effort to raise climate concerns in a specific human rights context, the
Inuit petition charged the United States with failing to take sufficient
steps to avoid climate change impacts on the Arctic. 19 The general
thrust of the Inuit's claim is set out in the following excerpt from the
petition:
The impacts of climate change, caused by acts and omissions by
the United States, violate the Inuit's fundamental human rights
protected by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man and other international instruments. These include their rights
to the benefits of culture, to property, to the preservation of health,
life, physical integrity, security, and a means of subsistence, and to
residence, movement, and inviolability of the home.
Because Inuit culture is inseparable from the condition of their
physical surroundings, the widespread environmental upheaval
resulting from climate change violates the Inuit's right to practice
and enjoy the benefits of their culture. The subsistence culture
central to Inuit cultural identity has been damaged by climate
change, and may cease to exist if action is not taken
by the United
2
States in concert with the community of nations. 0
The petitioners clearly sought to use their human rights claims to
build political will to address the impacts they faced from climate
change. 2 1 The requested relief included requests for an investigation,
hearing, and report declaring the United States responsible for human
rights violations and recommending, among other things, that the
United States adopt mandatory measures to limit its emissions of
greenhouse gases, to consider the impacts of U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions on the Arctic before approving all major government
actions, and to implement plans to protect the Inuit culture and
provide resources and assistance in adapting to climate change.22
The Inter-American Commission ultimately decided not to pursue
the Inuit Petition as a contested case, and dismissed it for failing to
demonstrate a violation of the rights protected in the American
Declaration. 23 Instead, the Inter-American Commission on Human
is See Inuit Petition. supra note 8.
19 Id. at 76.
20

Id. at 5.

21

Donald M. Goldberg & Martin Wagner. C1EL & Earthjustice, PetitioningforAdverse

Impacts of Global Warming in the Inter-American Human Rights System (2002),
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/PetitioningGlobalWarming IAHR.pdf.
22 Inuit Petition, supra note 8, at 18; see also Wagner & Goldberg, supra note 13, at 4.
23 Letter from Ariel E. Dulitzky, Assistant Executive Sec'y, Inter-Am. Comm'n on
Human Rights, to Paul Crowley, Legal Representative (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with
author).
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Rights invited the petitioners to testify at an information hearing on
March 1, 2007, to investigate the relationship between global warming
and human rights2 4 Although not successful legally, the Inuit petition
brought substantial international attention to the plight of the Inuit and
undoubtedly enhanced their influence and visibility in international
climate negotiations.
At least one native village has taken a different legal approach,
pursuing compensation for the costs of relocating its village in U.S.
Federal Court. On February 26, 2008, the Native Village of Kivalina
filed a suit based on theories of public nuisance, private nuisance, and
conspiracy to commit a tortious wrong. 25 Although not explicitly
couched in terms of international human rights, the injuries to the
village's way of life do raise rights-based issues not unlike those raised
in the Inter-American Commission.
B. The Small Island States
As part of their effort to raise awareness of the long-term
implications of climate change for their continued existence, small
island states have also begun to frame their concerns in terms of
human rights. In November 2007, for example, in anticipation of the
Bali Conference of the Parties under the UNFCCC, the Association of
Small Island Developing States issued a declaration requesting that
the OHCHR "conduct a detailed study into the effects of climate
change on the full enjoyment of human rights, which includes
relevant conclusions and recommendations thereon. 26
Whether because of the call made by the small island states or
otherwise, the U.N. Human Rights Council requested the OHCHR
conduct "a detailed analytical study on the relationship between climate
change and human rights, to be submitted to the Council prior to its

24 CIEL, Global Warming and Human Rights Gets Hearing on the World Stage,
http://www.ciel.org/Climate/IACIR Inuit 5Mar07.html (providing links to testimony) (last
visited Jan. 7, 2010): Audio tape: Human Rights and Global Warming, Public Hearings of the
127 Period of Sessions, held by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 1,
2007), http://www.cidh.org/audiencias/select.aspx (follow "127 Period of Sessions (February
26-March 9. 2007)" hyperlink, then select "Thursday. March 01, 2007").
25 See Complaint, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 4:08cv1 138,
2008 WL 594713 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Kivalina Complaint]. The case has
been dismissed by the District Court and is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See Native
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.. No. C08-1138 SBA. 2009 WL 3326113 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 30, 2009).
26 MALE' DECLARATION, supra note 14, at 3.
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tenth session., 27
The OHCHR report, issued in January 2009,
highlighted the implications of climate change for the full enjoyment
of several specific human rights, including the rights to life, water,
food, housing, health, and self-determination, 2 8 and on vulnerable
groups such as women, children, and indigenous peoples.29 The
Human Rights Council in its 2009 meeting subsequently affirmed the
general findings of the OHCHR report and continued to outline future
work in the area for the Council, the OHCHR, and the Special
Rapporteur on Housing.30 Importantly, the Human Rights Council
showed its intention to keep U.N. human rights institutions engaged
in the climate change debate, forcing dialogue that can potentially
enhance policy coordination between the
• 31twin goals of climate change
prevention and human rights protection.
II
IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE

The traditional approach to complex environmental issues is to
establish a regulatory regime and the institutional capacity to manage
the environmental problems over time. Particularly with respect to
pollution issues, environmental regulators generally reach compromises
between the environmental and public health costs of the pollution on
the one hand with the economic costs of abating the pollution on the
other. The resulting environmental policy only rarely forbids all
pollution, but instead looks for levels that do not cause an unreasonable
risk to public health or the environment. The black-and-white nature of
human rights does not fit well into this management-oriented,
compromise-laden approach.32

27 UNHRC Res. 7/23,
1, U.N. Doc. A/ RC/RES/7/23 (Mar. 28, 2008). For a
thorough treatment of the U.N. Human Rights Council's approach to climate change, see
Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political
Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 439 (2009).
28 OHCHR Report, supra note 3,
20-4 1.
29 Id. 45 54.
30 UNHRC, Promotion and ProtectionofAll Human Rights, Civil, Political,Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, U.N. Doc.
A/IIRC/10/L.30 (Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Human Rights Council Resolution on
Climate Change]; see also Limon. supra note 27. at 447-48.
31 See OHCHR Report, supra note 3; see also supra text accompanying notes 3, 5 8.
32 See generally Michael R. Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental
Protection: An

Overview,

in HUMAN RIGHTS

APPROACHES

TO ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION, supra note 15, at 21 23 (discussing the human rights approach).
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To date, the international approach to climate change has largely
mirrored the management approach taken to other complex
environmental problems. The overall approach of the climate regime is
that scientists will identify safe levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases
concentrations (and by extension, safe levels of greenhouse gas
emissions), and the climate regime will align countries to reach those
levels through a variety of management tools, including most notably
the Kyoto Protocol's cap-and-trade system.33 This is reflected in the
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, which is to achieve "stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system. 3 4
The objective links the determination of what is
"dangerous" to goals of ecosystem conservation, food security, and
sustainable development, but it does not suggest that the climate
regime will be concerned with harms to individual rights or with
seeking compensation or demonstrating liability.35 These latter goals
would be more commensurate with a system that was concerned with
vindicating or promoting individual rights and interests.
The management approach is also reflected in the growth and focus
of the climate change secretariat, located in Bonn, Germany. The
climate change secretariat is charged with supporting the annual
meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and otherwise
implementing the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 36 The climate
secretariat is an impressive collection of technical experts, scientists,
and policy analysts who have formed a significant bureaucracy for
managing the carbon market and other aspects of international climate
33 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 6, Dec. 11. 1997. 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (describing
the basic outline of the cap-and-trade system).
34 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] art. 2, May
9. 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Convention on Climate Change]. Article 2 states:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
35

Id.

36 UNFCCC, Contact Us, http://unfccc.int (follow "Contact Us" hyperlink); see also
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 34, art. 8 (describing the secretariat's
functions).
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policy. 37 The primary role involves data collection and exchange
among the parties regarding greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation
efforts, impacts, and the overall effectiveness of the regime. The net
result is that the climate regime is particularly good at "carbon
accounting," but less focused on issues of liability, compensation, or
the vindication of individual rights.
In the end, an increased focus on the linkage between human rights
and climate change cannot be expected to replace, or even
fundamentally change, the technocratic approach to managing climate
change risks under the climate change regime. Nor should it, but a
human rights perspective can make vital contributions in expanding the
diversity of perspectives that are heard in the climate debate and as a
result the range of policies and approaches that are ultimately adopted.
First, human rights can provide a basis for apportioning responsibility
and liability as between those who have caused climate change and
those who will suffer from it most. 39 Second, framing climate change
impacts through human rights highlights the moral dimension of
climate change in a way that can build political will to respond more
effectively. 4° Third, the consideration of human rights means a
different set of institutional actors and voices will be brought into the
climate change debate that can improve decision making. 4 Fourth,
attention to human rights can help to screen certain types of
mitigation responses to climate change.42 Fifth, human rights can
provide a way to prioritize how the global community allocates scarce
resources to adapt to climate change.4 3

A. Legal Liability for Human Rights Violations
In contrast to the environmental field's focus on managing
complexities through compromise, the human rights field's focus is
on protecting and promoting human rights through ensuring
accountability, responsibility, and liability. Thus, the process of

37 For a diagram of the secretariat's structure, see UNFCCC, Secretariat Structure,
http://unfccc.int/secretariat/progranimes/items/2098.php.
38 See generally Convention on Climate Change, supra note 34, arts. 7 8 (describing
the secretariat's functions); Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33, arts. 13 14, (enumerating the
roles of the Conference of the Parties and the Secretariat).
39 See infra text accompanying notes 44 57.

40 See infra text accompanying notes 58 70.
41See infra text accompanying notes 71 96.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 97 110.
43 See infra text accompanying notes II- 18.

2009]

Human Rights Implicationsfor
Climate Change Negotiations

341

identifying and documenting potential human rights violations
brought about by climate change brings with it the implicit possibility
of a legal remedy against those States that are responsible for climate
change. Such was the position taken by the Inuit in their petition to
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 44 and in the
submission by the Maldives to the U.N. Human Rights Commission.45
In short, those whose rights are being violated will argue for a legal
remedy.
In the context of climate change, to secure a robust legal remedy
for human rights violations may prove to be difficult. 46 Despite the
attention brought on the Inuit's plight by their petition, the InterAmerican Commission deflected the petition's legal claims, resorting
instead to a more politically acceptable hearing on the linkages
between climate change and human rights. 4' Nor have island state
residents yet pressed for, or received, any legal remedies for the
impending impacts on their lives from climate change. Some of the
obstacles to bringing a human rights claim in the climate context were
also noted by the OHCHR Report:
While climate change has obvious implications for the enjoyment of
human rights, it is less obvious whether, and to what extent, such
effects can be qualified as human rights violations in a strict legal
sense. Qualifying the effects of climate change as human rights
violations poses a series of difficulties. First, it is virtually
impossible to disentangle the complex causal relationships linking
historical greenhouse gas emissions of a particular country with a
specific climate change-related effect ....Second, global warming
is often one of several contributing factors to climate change-related
effects, such as hurricanes, environmental degradation and water
stress. . . . Third, adverse effects of global warming are often
projections about future impacts, whereas human rihts violations
are normally established after the harm has occurred.
As the OHCHR points out, attributing particular impacts on human
rights to climate change is difficult, as is determining the overall
contribution of each country or of private industry .49 As a result, even

44
45
46

Inuit Petition, supra note 8.
Maldives Submission, supra note 2.
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 12.

CTEL, supra note 24.
OHCHR Report, supra note 3, 70 (footnotes omitted); see Posner, supra note 12, at
1925 ("[T]here is little reason to believe that international human rights litigation would
lead to a desirable outcome.").
49 OHCHR Report, supra note 3,
70.
47
48
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though climate change will affect and have implications for the
satisfaction and fulfillment of various human rights, those countries
contributing most to climate change may not necessarily be deemed to
violate the human rights of those who suffer from climate change.
On the other hand, the scientific understanding of climate change
and its impacts is improving. The ability to document links between
global warming, particular climate change-related events, and human
rights impacts will improve over time, and so will the potential 50for
successful rights-based litigation, particularly at the national level.
Thus, regardless of whether climate change-related human rights
violations ever form the basis for an international human rights claim,
the legal dimension of human rights may still be important at the
national level. 5' The Inupiat village of Kivalina's claim against major
fossil fuel companies is one rights-based example.52 Although it is
too early to know whether that litigation will be successful, rightsbased climate-related litigation has been successful in other countries.
For example, the Federal High court of Nigeria has upheld citizens'
claims that the practice of flaring natural gas released during oil
extraction harmed their individual rights to life and dignity.53
Moreover, success at the national level in gaining compensation for
climate change victims could build pressure for an international

50 See generally Myles Allen et al., Scientific Challenges in the Attribution of Harm to
Human Influence on Climate, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1353 (2007) (discussing difficulties in
establishing direct links between human influences and harm); Myles Allen, Liabilityfor
Climate Change, 421 NATURE 891-92 (2003) (discussing the possibility of suing for
climate damage); Peter A. Stott et al., Human Contribution to the European Heatwave of
2003, 432 NATURE 610 (2004) (discussing the link between human activities and the
European 2007 heatwave. the hottest since AD 1500): Simone Bastianoni et al., The
Problem of Assigning Responsibilityfor Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 49 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 253 (2004) (discussing difficulties in assigning responsibility for greenhouse gas
emissions).
51 Some victims of Hurricane Katrina are also pursuing compensation for damages they
claim were exacerbated by climate change. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA. No. 0760756, 2009 WL 3321493, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2009) (reversing the District Court's
dismissal of the complaint).
52 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. C08-1138 SBA, 2009 WL
3326113 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009).
53 Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co., No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, (F.H.C.N. Nov. 14.
2005) (Nigeria), available at http://www.climatelaw.org/cases/case-documents/nigeria/ni
-shell-nov05-judgment.pdf. Although the plaintiffs raised climate change-related impacts,
the Court's decision was ultimately not based solely on climate change impacts. See
Sinden, supra note 12, at 173 (analyzing the relationship of the case to climate change and
human rights). Press Release, Climate Justice Programme. Court Orders Nigerian Gas
Flaring to Stop (Nov. 14. 2005), http://climatelaw.org/media/2005Novl4 (announcing the
Federal High Court's judgment).
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liability regime patterned generally after existing liability regimes
covering injuries from hazardous wastes, 5 4 oil spills, 55 or nuclear
accidents or wastes 6
Focusing on the litigation aspects of human rights may also be too
limiting in understanding the legal dimensions of climate-related
human rights violations. As the OHCHR concluded, even if climate
change-related harm cannot be attributed to acts or omissions of
specific States, "addressing that harm remains a critical human rights
concern and obligation under international law.
Hence, legal
protection remains relevant as a safeguard against climate changerelated risks and infringements of human rights resulting from
policies and measures taken at the national level to address climate
change.' 7 States are not relieved from their obligations to protect
and promote human rights because a rights violation cannot be easily
vindicated in a legal proceeding.
B. The Moral Authority of Human Rights
Even if a legal remedy may not be readily available, a rights-based
approach lends moral authority and with it rhetorical power to the
victims of climate change. This moral authority can be an effective
counterweight to the technocratic approaches that otherwise dominate
the climate change debate. As Michael Anderson has suggested, "a
human rights approach is a strong claim, a claim to an absolute
entitlement theoretically immune to the lobbying and trade-offs which
characterize bureaucratic decision-making. Its power
lies in its ability
58
to trump individual greed and short-term thinking.,

54 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999,
available at http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs/prot-e.pdf (not yet in force).
55 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.29, 1969,
973 U.N.T.S. 265.
56 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. July 29,
1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May
21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 266; Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field
of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material. Dec. 17. 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255.
57 OHCHR Report, supra note 3,
96.
58 Anderson, supra note 32, at 21. Anderson notes that "[o]ften, the real value of a
human right is that it is available as a moral trump card precisely when legal arrangements
fail." Id. at 12 13. Furthermore,
A second advantage is that the procedural dimensions of an environmental right
can provide access to justice in a way that bureaucratic regulation, or tort law,
simply cannot. A robust environmental right can mobilize redress where other
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As an example, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) in its 2007 Human Development Report Summary described
climate change in this way:
[Climate change] is a human tragedy in the making. Allowing that
tragedy to evolve would be a political failure that merits the
description of an "outrage to the conscience of mankind". It would
represent a systematic violation of the human rights of the world's
poor and future generations and a step back from universal
values. . . . The real choice facing political leaders and people
today is between universal human values, on the one side, and
participating in the59widespread and systematic violation of human
rights on the other.
Describing climate change in such terms brings into focus the
human implications of future climate change impacts. The numbers

support the UNDP's invocation of human rights. An estimated 262
million people were affected by climate-related disasters annually
from 2000 to 2004, over ninety-eight percent of them in the
developing world. 60 Not all of these climate-related disasters can be
attributed to climate change, but in the future nearly all types of
climate-related disasters (floods, hurricanes, droughts) are expected to
be exacerbated in many regions of the world by climate change.6 1
The numbers support the view that climate change may have
systemic human rights implications, but perhaps more importantly a
human rights perspective forces us to examine climate change at the
individual victim's level. Our focus is placed on those who suffer
today from climate change as opposed to some abstract discussion of
parts per million or millimeters of sea level rise. Delay is less likely
when negotiators are confronted directly by the faces and voices of
those who are suffering immediately.
The Inupiat village of
Kivalina's description of their homes subsiding into the Arctic

remedies have failed. . . . Thirdly, a human rights approach may stimulate
concomitant political activism on environmental issues. Concerned citizens and
NGOs are more likely to rally around a general statement of right than a highly
technical, bureaucratic regulation expressed in legalese.
Id. at 21-22.
59 UNDP, Human Development Report 200712008: Summary, at 10 (2008). available at
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_SummaryEnglish.pdf [hereinafter UADP
Summary].
60

Id. at 16.

See generally IPCC 2007: The Physical Science Basis, supra note I (describing
drivers of climate change, the process of climate change, and the projected future climate
change).
61
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Ocean 62 is a more vivid and urgent statement about sea level rise than
is the IPCC prediction that sea levels will rise 0.59 meters by the end
of the century. 63 In this way, human rights narratives can build the
political will of the negotiators by taking them out of their
technocratic comfort zone and forcing them to confront the realities of
a changing planet.
1. Rights to the Atmosphere
A human rights-based perspective can also provide a moral frame
for one of the most fundamental questions facing the international
climate change regime-how to allocate the rights to pollute the
atmosphere. The basic approach of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol is that science will inform policymakers of the appropriate
level of greenhouse gas emissions that can be allowed in order to
protect us from a high risk of climate catastrophe.64 Once this global
cap on greenhouse gas emissions is agreed, the further question
remains how to allocate the global cap on emissions among the
various countries of the world.
From a rights-based perspective, only one answer is defensible- 65
the atmosphere must be allocated on an equitable per capita basis.
Every individual deserves an equal right to share in the benefits of a
global commons resource, such as the atmosphere and the global
climate system. As put by Professor Sachs:

62 See Kivalina Complaint, supra note 25.
63 See IPCC 2007: The Physical Science Basis, supra note 1, at 13. Data released since
the IPCC report suggests that the rate of sea level rise is more than previously believed and
predicts levels of up to 1.4 meters by the end of the century. See Susan Solomon et al., A
Closer Look at the IPCC Report, 319 SCIENCE 409-10 (Jan. 25, 2008); see generally
David B. Hunter, The Implications of Climate Change Litigation: Litigation for
InternationalEnvironmental Law-Making, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE,
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES. supra note 12, at 357 (discussing

implications of a litigation-based approach to climate change).
64 Although this is hotly debated, most climate scientists and policymakers believe that
limiting human-caused global warming to 2°C or less is necessary to keep the risk of
catastrophic climate change low. See, e.g., IPCC 2007: The Physical Science Basis. supra
note 1. at 12 Most policymakers act on the assumption that stabilizing atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations at a level of 450 parts per million will limit the increase to
2°C. See, e.g.. MALE' DECLARATION, supra note 14, at 2. For a general discussion of the
relationship between greenhouse gas emissions, concentrations, and temperature rise, see
WOLD, HUNTER & POWERS, supra note 2, at 44-47.
65 Sachs, supra note 9, at 349.
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The atmosphere . . . belongs to nobody in particular and to

everybody equally; in other words, the atmosphere is a global
common good....

...

This calls for a framework that respects the principle of an equal

per capita right to the Earth's atmosphere.

Most other allocation

schemes would repeat a colonial style approach, granting
disproportionate shares to the North. If the use of a global common
good has to be restrained through collective rules, it would violate
the principle of equity to design these rules to the advantage of
some and the disadvantage of many. The equal right of all world
citizens to the
atmosphere
is therefore the cornerstone of any
• shared
•
66
viable climate regime.
In short, climate science will inform us as to the overall level of
global emissions that are possible without risking global climate
chaos, but climate science cannot tell us how to allocate the right to
pollute. That is a question of ethics, fairness, and, of course, politics.
By emphasizing the relationship of individual rights to the global
atmosphere, the human rights approach permits of no other formula
for allocation except one based on equality. Although other systems
exist for allocating rights to pollute under the cap, including, for
example, allocations based on historical emissions or on efficiency
(i.e., the amount of pollution per dollar of output), a rights-based
approach embraces each individual as an equal rights-holder in the
atmosphere (or in a benign climate system).
This presents a tremendous challenge to the climate negotiators.
The position is consistent with the overall framework agreed to in the
UNFCCC, particularly the principles of equity 67 and of common but
differentiated responsibilities 68 that underlie the overall climate
regime. These principles are premised on the idea that developed
countries would accept binding commitments first, and take real steps
to address climate change before developing countries would be
asked to make similar commitments. Such an allocation roughly
means that U.S. emissions must decline dramatically over time while
the emissions of such countries like China and India must be allowed
to grow. But this is easier said by academics than achieved by
66 Id.

67 Convention on Climate Change. supra note 34, art. 3. princ. 1 (providing that "[t]he
Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations
of humankind, on the basis of equity .... ").
68 See id. arts. 3, 4 (including the recognition that the Parties should participate in
climate change efforts in accordance with, and taking account of, "their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities").
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politicians. The allocations under the Kyoto Protocol, for example,
were not consistent with any systematic or principled approach; the
Kyoto Protocol's caps can only be understood as the result of political
compromise and the give-and-take of negotiations. 69 No overarching
principle explains why, for example, Australia was allowed to
increase their emissions by eight percent, while most European
countries had to decrease emissions eight percent. 70
Nothing
emerging from the post-Kyoto negotiations yet suggests that anything
will be different in the post-Kyoto regime.
As with the Kyoto negotiations, a rights-based approach is unlikely
to be so legally robust that it will constrain the countries in how they
ultimately negotiate the allocation of rights to pollute the atmosphere.
Nonetheless, the rights-based approach provides a clear moral and
ethical counterweight to arguments based primarily on economic
efficiency or political expedience. This strengthens the hands of
developing countries and others who have historically contributed less
to climate change (i.e., used less of the atmosphere) and it builds
pressure on the developed countries to reduce further their emissions
and push for convergence over time to an equal per capita level of
emissions.
In the end, human rights arguments should help
negotiators toward a more equitable solution than what would result
in the absence of such arguments.
C. Bringing New Voices to the Climate Debate
By traditional standards of international law, climate change
negotiations have always been open and transparent. 7 1 Literally
thousands of representatives from hundreds of different interest
groups and stakeholders regularly attend the global climate
negotiations.
The Bali Conference of the Parties saw 10,000
69 For a discussion of the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiations leading up to it. see
MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999);

Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1998).
70 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 33, Annex B.
71Public participation and access to information are considered fundamental principles
in international environmental law, and most environmental treaty regimes have developed
robust methods for including multiple stakeholders in the process of negotiation-at least
when compared to other areas of international law. See generally United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Brazil, June 3 14, 1992,
Rio Declarationon Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration] ("Environmental issues are best handled with
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level.").
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participants from 180 countries,72 and the Copenhagen talks held in
December 2009 hosted nearly four times that many. Civil society
participants in these negotiations have significant access to the
plenary and to some of the working groups, and many have developed
significant contacts and methods for monitoring and influencing the
negotiations. 73
A wide range of "side-events" parallel the
negotiations, providing non-State actors with opportunities to promote
their specific issues.
Taking advantage of these different opportunities, human rightsoriented groups have increasingly become active participants in the
climate change negotiations. The value added of a human rights
perspective is not that it opened the climate negotiations up, because
climate negotiations have long been public affairs. Rather, human
rights provide a policy framework that can amplify the voices of
certain stakeholders in the climate talks-namely those whose rights
are threatened.
Representatives of human rights organizations, indigenous
communities, and other vulnerable groups are experts in human rights
and thus to the extent human rights are viewed as relevant to climate
change, these groups have immediate legitimacy and potential
influence. Their voices have a chance to rise above what can
otherwise be a multi-stakeholder cacophony at huge climate meetings
and challenge the perspective of the carbon accountants-those
people and institutions that are experts in measuring atmospheric
greenhouse gas concentrations, estimating the amount of carbon
sequestered from forests, or measuring changes in emissions over
time. The carbon accountants are necessary and good at what they
do, but their voice carries little of the urgency reflected in the voices
of the small island states, indigenous peoples, and other vulnerable
groups that remind us of why we need a climate regime in the first
place. In short, human rights advocates put "people, their prosperity,
homes, survival and rights at the centre of the climate change
debate. 74
The Article next looks at the calls for greater recognition of
vulnerable groups in the climate regime, and then turns to the way

72 UNFCCC,
The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali,
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop 13/items/4049.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).
73 See Kal Raustiala & Natalie L. Bridgeman, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate
Regime, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (Urs Luterbacher
& DetlefF. Sprinz eds., 2d ed. forthcoming).

74 MALE' DECLARATION, supra note 14, at 3.

2009]

Human Rights Implicationsfor
Climate Change Negotiations

349

formal human rights institutions are being integrated into climate
governance.
1. Vulnerable and DisadvantagedGroups
International environmental law has long been sensitive to the
particular aspirations, concerns, and perspectives of vulnerable
groups, such as indigenous peoples75 and women.16 International
treaty regimes for fisheries management, 77 the conservation of
biological diversity, 78 and the reduction of persistent organic
pollutants 79 all make specific reference to the disparate impacts and
special situations of vulnerable groups. No such reference is present
in either the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol, which take a more
75 See Rio Declaration, supra note 71, princ. 22 ("Indigenous people and their
communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental management
and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should
recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective
participation in the achievement of sustainable development.") World Summit on
Sustainable Development. Aug. 26-Sept. 4. 2002. Johannesburg. S. Aft., Johannesburg
Declaration on Sustainable Development,
25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2
[hereinafter Johannesburg Declaration] ("We reaffirm the vital role of the indigenous
peoples in sustainable development.").
76 See Rio Declaration, supra note 71. princ. 20 ("Women have a vital role in
environmental management and development.
Their full participation is therefore
essential to achieve sustainable development."): JohannesburgDeclaration.supra note 75.
20 ("We are committed to ensuring that women's empowerment. emancipation and
gender equality are integrated in all the activities encompassed within Agenda 21, the
Millennium development goals and the Plan of Implementation of the Summit." (footnote
omitted)).
77 Agreement for the implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 24.2(b),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995) (emphasizing "the need to avoid adverse
impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers
and women fishworkers, as well as indigenous people .... ").
78 Convention on Biological Diversity, Dec. 29, 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, pmbl.
("Recognizing the close and traditional dependence of many indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources . . ." and
"Recognizing also the vital role that women play in the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity and affirming the need for the full participation of women at all levels
of policy-making and implementation for biological diversity conservation.").
79 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, pmbl., May 17, 2004, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/POPS/CONF/4 ("Acknowledging that the Arctic ecosystems and indigenous
communities are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification of persistent organic
pollutants and that contamination of their traditional foods is a public health issue," and
"Aware of the health concerns, especially in developing countries, resulting from local
exposure to persistent organic pollutants, in particular impacts upon women and, through
them, upon future generations").
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State-centered approach in recognizing the particular impacts on
vulnerable States, such as small island and low-lying States. °
The treaty regime's failure to acknowledge the interests of specific
vulnerable, non-State groups has not deterred indigenous peoples,
internally displaced refugees, women, and others to press for greater
sensitivity and increased participation within the climate regime.
Indigenous leaders have repeatedly called on the UNFCCC to
create, among other things, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Indigenous
Peoples and Climate Change within the UNFCCC framework.81 They
have also sought to have the COP provide financial support and
capacity building for their "full and effective participation,""82 and to
"take into account indigenous knowledge systems, culture, social
values, spirituality and ecosystems; as well as the full and equal
participation of Indigenous Peoples in all aspects and stages of
[Climate Impact Assessments]. "8' 3
Despite repeated calls, the
UNFCCC has not yet agreed to such a working group and at this point
indigenous peoples' organizations are allowed to participate in the
climate negotiations on essentially the same terms as any non-State
actor.
Women's groups are also becoming more vocal in seeking broader
recognition of the disparate gender impacts from climate change and
expanded economic opportunities being created through the carbon
market and climate-related development assistance.8 4 The Women's
Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), for example,
has called on the UNFCCC to "develop a gender strategy, invest in
gender-specific climate change research, and establish a system for
80 See, e.g., Convention on Climate Change. supra note 34. pmbl. ("Recognizingfurther
that low-lying and other small island countries, countries with low-lying coastal, arid and
semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and desertification, and developing
countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems are particularly vulnerable to the adverse
effects of climate change.").
81 Milan Declaration ofthe Sixth International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate
Change,
6(b). delivered to the Ninth Session of the Conference of the Parties to the
UAFCCC, (Nov. 29-30. 2003) [hereinafter Milan Declaration]: see also U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Report on the Second
Session, 47, U.N. Doc. E/2003/43, E/C.19/2003/22 (May 12-23. 2003).
82 Milan Declaration,supra note 8 1, 6(c).
83 Id.

6(i).

84 For a discussion on gender-based differences in vulnerability and adaptive capacity

to climate change, see IPCC, Working Group II, Contribution of Working Group ll to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 730 (2007),
available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/publications/AR4/index.html (follow "Chapter 17:
assessment of adaptation practices, options, constraints and capacity" hyperlink)
[hereinafter IPCC2007: Adaptation and Vulnerability].
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the use of gender-sensitive indicators and criteria for governments to
use in national reporting to the UNFCCC Secretariat, adaptation
planning, or projects under the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). 8 5
It is important to note that the demands are not only to be allowed
greater participatory rights in the political aspects of the global
climate regime, but, just as importantly, to be given equal or preferred
access to the economic benefits generated from the climate regime,
particularly the carbon market. They seek affirmative steps to ensure
that market-based approaches to curb climate change, such as the
Clean Development Mechanism,86 are accessible and provide
equitable benefits to traditionally vulnerable groups, including
indigenous peoples, resource-dependent communities, and women.
Indigenous peoples argue that no development projects should
occur involving their land without their prior informed consent, which
among other things implies a negotiated agreement on benefit-sharing
from any carbon-based revenues. Indigenous peoples fear that further
extending the CDM to support reduced deforestation will just add
more international financing and more economic pressure on their
forests, exacerbating the loss of autonomy at the local level. In a
recent declaration on climate change, indigenous peoples argued that
the CDM "must incorporate principles which address transparency,
87
free, prior and informed consent and equitable benefit sharing.
They also reiterated that "[a]ll development projects within
indigenous ancestral territories must respect our fundamental rights to
lands, territories, self-determination and ensure our right to our free,
prior and informed consent." 88 This is just as true for development

85 Women's Environment and Development Organization [WEDO] et al., Declaration
on Climate Change and Gender Equality, prepared for the High-Level Roundtable "How a
Changing Climate Impacts Women" (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter WEDO Declaration].
86 The clean development mechanism (CDM) was established as one of the flexibility
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol. supra note 33, art. 12. The
CDM is a project-based mechanism through which an investor (typically from a developed
country) purchases emissions credits that result from reduced emissions in a project
located in a developing country. The following illustrates how the CDM works: assuming
that it is cheaper to convert a coal fired power plant to natural gas in Sio Paulo than in
Paris, a French utility facing requirements to reduce green house gas emissions could
invest in the Brazilian project and, in return, the French utility would receive certified
emission reduction (CER) credits amounting to the differential between a coal-fired (more
emitting) and a gas-fired (less emitting) power plant.
87 Milan Declaration,supra note 8 1, 6(e).
88 Id. 6(f).
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projects aimed at protecting the climate system as it is for more
traditional development projects.
Women's groups have sought to ensure that these new markets do
not perpetuate or exacerbate the disproportionate access between
women and men to natural resources such as water and energy, land
titles, credit, or information.8 9 They seek a preference from the CDM
for projects that, for example, make renewable technologies more
available to women to meet their household needs.
Until now, these efforts have been decidedly mixed. The forms of
participation for indigenous peoples and women's representatives
have not been significantly different than other civil society
representatives, nor does the climate regime yet reflect the specific
concerns or perspectives from these or other vulnerable groups.
Nonetheless, their perspectives are shaping the overall policy debate
and in the future may lead to important conditions or priorities being
set to respond to their specific needs.
2. ExpandingHuman Rights Institutional Voices

International environmental governance is replete with examples of
fractured policy-making caused by the relatively narrow mandates of
different international institutions coupled with underdeveloped
mechanisms for cooperation between institutions. The merger of
human rights and climate change presents just such a challenge with
both the climate regime secretariat and the various human rights
institutions having clear mandates in their own areas of operation, but
less clarity in how their two areas or institutions should be
integrated. 90

The U.N. Human Rights Council has taken the initiative in
examining the appropriate institutional approach to integrate the
concerns of human rights and climate change. In March, 2009, it
"encouraged" the OHCHR "to participate at a senior level" in the
Copenhagen climate talks.9 1 The Human Rights Council also
welcomed:

89

See WEDO Declaration,supra note 85.

In part to catalyze human rights and climate change institutions to consider
innovative ways of cooperation, the Center for International Environmental Law and the
Freidrich Ebert Stiftung issued a report suggesting several possible steps. See CTEL,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: PRACTICAL STEPS FOR IMPLEMENTATION. 6-7
(2009).
http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/HumanRights/StudyFES
_CIEL 2009.pdf [hereinafter CIEL PRACTICAL STEPS].
91 2009 Human Rights Council Resolution on Climate Change, supra note 30, 5.
90
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[T]he decision of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing.., to
prepare and present a thematic report on the potential impact of
climate change on the right to adequate housing, and encourage[d]
other relevant special procedure mandate-holders to give
consideration
92 to the issue of climate change within their respective
mandates.
Still an open question is how exactly the Human Rights Council
should continue its involvement beyond these initial steps. CIEL has
identified several possible approaches for the Human Rights Council
to further the integration of human rights and climate change.93 CIEL
suggested that the OHCHR continue to study the relationship between
human rights and climate change, establish a special rapporteur or
other procedure to discuss climate change, or the Human Rights
Council could specifically cover climate change in its universal
quadrennial reviews
of the human rights records of each of the U.N.
94
member states.
The climate change institutions could also take proactive steps to
address linkages with human rights. CIEL recommended several
ways that the UNFCCC secretariat could strengthen its commitment
to human rights, ranging from creating a focal point on human rights
to negotiating subsequent treaties, procedures, or mechanisms that
expand the participation of indigenous peoples in climate-related
institutions or otherwise protect human rights. 95 The climate change
96
secretariat has recently created such a focal point on human rights.
These formal institutional responses could provide the governance
architecture for enhanced cooperation and policy integration in the
future. Over time, the institutional coordination could be enhanced,
perhaps with the long-term goal of providing a forum for hearing and
responding to the human rights concerns of climate change victims.

92

Id. 3.

93 CIEL PRACTICAL STEPS, supra note 90, at 6 7 (making recommendations for steps
the Human Rights Council could take to address the relationship between human rights
and climate change).
94 Id.; see also OHCHR Universal Periodic Review, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBODIES/UPR/Pages/UPRMain.aspx (describing OHCHR's review process) (last
visited Jan. 11, 2010).
95 C1EL PRACTICAL STEPS. supra note 90. at 7.
96 E-mail from Martin Schoenberg. UNFCCC Secretariat (Jan. 26. 2010) (on file with
author) (describing his role as the focal point between the UNFCCC and the OHCHR).
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D. Shaping Mitigation Responses
Most observers focused on the implications of climate change for
human rights appropriately emphasize how climate change itself will
undermine the protection and promotion of human rights.
Increasingly clear, however, is that the choice of policy responses to
climate change may also have implications for the achievement of
human rights. Parties to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), for example, are obligated to
cooperate internationally to promote the progressive realization of
economic, social, and cultural rights. 9' Thus, ICESCR parties who
are also parties to the climate regime must ensure that steps taken to
address climate change do not undermine their ability to promote the
progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural rights. In
this context, efforts both to avoid climate change (i.e., mitigation) and
to lessen the impacts of climate change that do occur (i.e., adaptation)
have the potential to raise issues that overlap with human rights. This
section addresses the human rights implications of mitigation
approaches and the next section addresses adaptation.
Several mitigation options emerging from the negotiation and
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol clearly have human rights
implications. Moreover, rights-based concerns over these mitigation
measures are already having a significant impact on the climate
debate, influencing both whether and how these policies will be used
to address climate change. Two of these mitigation approachesbiofuels and reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation-are explored briefly below.
1. Biofuels

Biofuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel, are frequently promoted as
an important alternative to gasoline and other fossil fuels. Biofuels
show some promise of reducing greenhouse gas emissions when
compared to traditional fossil fuels, depending on which biofuel is

97 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI). at Part 11. Art. 2, 21 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16. U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966) states:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps. individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.
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used and the method used to produce it. As a result, biofuels are a
major component of many national climate change programs. For
example, the European Union has set a goal of using ten percent
biofuels in all diesel and gasoline.98
Putting aside concerns over the life-cycle carbon footprint of many
biofuels, 99 scaling up biofuel production to a level that could make a
significant impact on total greenhouse gas concentrations has
significant implications for the availability and price of food. One
analysis suggests that approximately one-sixth of the world's
croplands would need to be converted to biofuels to scale up
production to the levels necessary to combat climate change.100 As
cropland is converted from producing food to energy, however,
concern grows that the price of food may increase and the availability
of affordable food may decrease.
Just such concerns came to a head in 2008 as the growing demand
for biofuels was viewed as at least a contributing factor to soaring
world food prices.
In 2008, the U.N. Food and Agricultural
Organization convened the High Level Conference on World Food
and recognized the links between biofuels, soaring food prices, and
food security.' 0' Similarly, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social,

98 Council Directive 2009/28,

9, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 17 (EC).

99 Significant controversy and uncertainty exists over the extent to which various
biofuels will actually result in net reduced greenhouse gas emissions once the impact of
land and crop conversions are taken into account. See, e.g., P.J. Crutzen et al., A20
Release from Agro-Biofuel Production Negates Global Warming Reduction by Replacing
Fossil Fuels, 8 ATMOS. CHEM. PHYS. 389. 391 (2008) (nitrous oxide emissions from
converting biomass to biofuels would offset climate benefits gained from reducing C02
emissions); David Pimentel & Marcia Pimentel, Corn and Cellulosic Ethanol Cause
Major Problems, 8 ENERGIES 35. 36 (2008) (cellulosic ethanol production requires 170%
more energy than corn ethanol); Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for
Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land Use Change. 319
SCIENCE 1238 (2008) (changing to corn ethanol would double net greenhouse gas
emissions); Joseph Fargione et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319
SCIENCE 1235 (2008) (land conversion to biomass would initially release 17 to 420 times
the amount of greenhouse gas emissions compared to what was saved): Bruce A. Babcock
et al., Is Corn Ethanol a Low-Carbon Fuel?, 13 IoWA AGRIC. REV. 1 (2007).
100 See, e.g., S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate
Problemfor the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968. 971 (2004)
(arguing that scaling up biofuel production to a sufficient level would require shifting
about one-sixth of the world's cropland into high-yield biofuel plantations).
101High-Level Conference on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate
Change and Bioenergy. June 3-5. 2008, Rome. Italy. Declarationon World Food Security,
7(f). available at http://www.fao.org/foodclimate/conference/declaration/en/ [hereinafter
Declarationon World Food Security].
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and Cultural Rights [CESCR] at least implicitly identified the
production of biofuels as a contributor to the 2008 food crisis and a
long-term factor undermining efforts to fulfill the human right to
adequate food. The CESCR urged States parties:
[T]o address the structural causes [of the food crisis] at the national
and international levels, including by:
Implementing strategies to combat global climate change that do
not negatively affect the right to adequate food and freedom from
hunger, but rather promote sustainable agriculture, as required by
article 210of
2 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
In this way, the CESCR also highlighted the existing links between
the UNFCCC's objective of protecting food security and the related
right to adequate food.
Although it is difficult to determine the extent to which rising food
prices were due to shifting agricultural production to biofuels, the
concerns raised by human rights groups has certainly shifted the
debate regarding biofuels. Concerns over food security, when
coupled with general concerns over the life-cycle effectiveness of
biofuels, likely means that considerably less reliance will be placed
on biofuels as a major mitigation option in the future.
2. Reduced Emissionsfrom Deforestation and ForestDegradation
(REDD)
Another mitigation option that has significant human rights
implications is the effort to reduce deforestation in developing
countries.
Deforestation, forest degradation, and other land-use
changes account for approximately seventeen percent of all global

greenhouse gas emissions, and much of this occurs in developing

102 ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCR], Statement on the
World Food Crisis. 13. U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2008/1 (May 19, 2008).

The Committee therefore urges States to take urgent action, including by:
Limiting the rapid rise in food prices by, inter alia, encouraging production of local
staple food products for local consumption instead of diverting prime arable land
suitable for food crops for the production of [biofuels], as well as the use of food
crops for the production of agrofuel ....
Id.

11. See also Declaration on World Food Security, supra note 10 1.
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countries.10 3 A number of developing countries, including Papua
New Guinea, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Bolivia have led an effort within
the climate negotiations to create a mechanism by which developing
countries would be compensated for reducing their rates of
deforestation.104
These efforts led to the formal inclusion of
compensation for reduced deforestation as part of the negotiating
framework for the post-Kyoto climate negotiations. Among other
things, the parties agreed to consider "[p]olicy approaches and
positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions
from
0 5
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries."'
Although a focus on how to strengthen forest governance and
protect the ecosystem services of forests is laudable, the devil will be
in the details. Indigenous peoples and other traditional users of
forests remain quite concerned that the climate regime will catalyze
further incursions into their territories with limited consultation or
participation from forest dwellers. The U.N. Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues recently recommended that the "renewed political
focus on forests" in the UNFCCC:
[B]e used towards securing the rights of indigenous peoples living
in forests and rewarding their historical stewardship role and
continuing conservation and sustainable use of forests. According
to the principle of free, prior and informed consent, indigenous
peoples must not be excluded from, and should be centrally
involved in and benefit from, deciding forest policies and
programmes at all levels that deliver justice and equity and

103 IPCC, Working Group I11, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. at 27 (2007).
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/publications ipcc fourth assessment report
wg3 report mitigation of climate change.htm
(follow
"Technical
Summary"
hyperlink).
104 See. e.g.. UNFCCC. Subsidiary Body for Scientific & Technological Advice. Views
on the Range of Topics and Other Relevant Information Relating to Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation in Developing Countries. at 11-20. 21-25, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2 (Mar. 2.2007) see generally Mdrcio Santilli et al., Tropical
Deforestation and the Kyoto Protocol: An Editorial Essay, 71 CLIMATIC CHANGE 267,
269-73 (2005) (describing the concept of compensated reductions for reduced
deforestation).
105 See UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties. Bali. Indon.. Dec. 3-15, 2007. Report of
the Conference of the Parties Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of
the Parties at its Thirteenth Session, dec. 1/CP.13.
1(b)(iii). at 3, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2007/cop 13/eng/06a01.pdf.
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contribute to sustainable development, biodiversity
protection and
10 6

climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The Permanent Forum also noted the lack of support for REDD as
currently constituted because of the fear that it would be one more

form of top-down, externally driven forest management that
disempowers indigenous peoples and undermines their use of the
forests.' 0 ' Governmental decisions about forests have historically
been made without the participation of forest-dwelling communities
and involved distant government officials making concessions to
foreign timber companies to exploit the forests where these
communities live. Many forest-dwelling communities are concerned
that in the REDD proposals, the national governments are just finding
one more revenue stream that they can sell with little input from, or
benefit to, forest-dwelling communities.
Such communities seek greater transparency and increased
procedural rights in decisions that affect these forests. That includes a
greater need for transparency and enforcement of their rights to grant
(or withhold) prior informed consent with respect to activities on
indigenous lands.108 These communities also seek a greater role in
determining how the forest will be used and a greater share in the
benefits from the carbon revenues that are associated with the forest.
Although it is still unclear how deforestation will ultimately be
addressed in the international climate change regime, the rights-based
approach has certainly forced the discussion in the climate
negotiations to go beyond the extent to which carbon benefits arise
from avoided deforestation. 109 This is also true at the national level,
where, for example, the Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy
and Security Act that passed the U.S. House of Representatives
conditions the availability of offsets from reduced deforestation to
projects that "give due regard to the rights and interests of local
communities, indigenous peoples, forest-dependent communities, and
vulnerable social groups." 110

106 ECOSOC, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on the Seventh Session,
44, U.N. Doc. E/2008/43 (May 2, 2008).

107

Id. 45.

108 Id.77 44-45.

109See UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties, Presidential Proposal, Copenhagen
Accord, Draft Decision -/CP.15. U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/L.7,
6 (Dec. 18. 2009)
[hereinafter Copenhagen Accord] (endorsing REDD generally).
I 0 American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st
Sess.) § 754(d)(6)(A) (2009).
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E. PrioritizingAdaptation
In climate change parlance, adaptation measures are those
measures that are meant to alleviate the impacts of climate change (as
opposed to mitigation measures meant to avoid climate change).
Examples of adaptation run the range from building higher levees, to
preparing evacuation and disaster relief plans, to relocating climate
refugees from coastal and island communities.
Many potential
adaptation measures are designed to avoid human suffering and, thus,
may help countries meet their obligations to promote human rights.
In recent years, climate negotiators have been forced to increase
their focus on adaptation, given that many climate impacts are
virtually certain at this point and that human suffering and economic
losses can be reduced through some adaptive strategies. As the 2007
IPCC report points out, "Even the most stringent mitigation efforts
cannot avoid further impacts of climate change in the next few
decades, which makes adaptation unavoidable." '' Indeed, where the
need for adaptation was formerly viewed as decades away,
recognition of current climate impacts, such as melting glaciers and
sea ice, prolonged droughts, and more intense storms, has brought the
timeframe for discussing adaptation forward, even in the United
States.
The anticipated financial needs for adaptation are massive. UNDP
estimates $86 billion will be required for adaptation globally just by
2015.112 The Copenhagen Accord, negotiated in December 2009,
provides an estimated $30 billion in assistance for both mitigation and
adaption from 2010 to 2012 increasing to $100 billion per year by

III IPCC, Working Group II, Contribution of Working Group Il to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, at 747 (2007).
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/ar4/wg2/en/contents.html (follow
"Chapter 18: Inter-relationships between adaption and mitigation" hyperlink).
112UNDP Summary, supra note 59, at 26. A UNFCCC estimate puts the cost to
developing countries between $28 to $67 billion per year by 2030, which is generally
consistent with estimates from Oxfam ($50 billion/year) and the World Bank (up to $50
billion for developing countries). See Oxfam Int'l, Financing Adaptation: Why the UN's
Bali Climate Conference Must Mandate the Search for New Funds (Dec. 4, 2007),
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/climate change/bn bali adaptation.html
(follow "Download full paper" hyperlink); UNFCCC, Investment and Financial Flows
Relevant to the Development of an Effective and Appropriate InternationalResponse to
Climate Change (2007). http://unfccc.int/cooperation and support/financial mechanism/
items/4053.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
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2020.113 These funds are expected to come from both public and
private sources and are intended for both mitigation and adaption.
The Adaption Fund, an innovative mechanism established by the
Kyoto Protocol parties, receives two percent of the certified emission
reductions (CERs) of each project approved through the clean
development mechanism.' 4 In this way, the Adaptation Fund may
raise as much as $300 million per year without relying on the foreign
assistance budgets of developed countries, assuming that this
mechanism continues beyond 2012, the final year of the Kyoto
Protocol's current reporting period. Taken together, all of the
currently identified sources of support for adaption remain
substantially less than the estimated adaptation costs.' 1 5
A human rights perspective could have a significant role in
enhancing and prioritizing international adaptation strategies. First,
countries may be under an obligation to ensure that certain basic
human rights are met in the face of a changing climate. For example,
the right to food, water, and shelter after a natural disaster may
generate demands for humanitarian response.' 16 This could enhance
political, moral, and perhaps legal pressure on industrialized countries
to provide larger amounts of money for adaptation.
Beyond the quantity of money, a human rights framework may
help set priorities for where we spend limited adaptation money. In
the case of natural disasters, for example, the right to housing
suggests that people have the right to temporary housing and shelter
while their permanent homes are being repaired." 7 Providing basic
shelter to the victims of natural disasters would arguably be a higher
priority than other adaptation expenses. Viewed in this light, the
113 Copenhagen Accord supra note 109; see also UNFCCC Ad Hoc Working Group on
Long-Term cooperative Action Under the Convention. Policy Approaches and Positive
Incentives on Issues Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation in Developing Countries; and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable
Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks in Developing
Countries, Draft Decision -/CP. 15, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add. 6, 2(c)
(Dec. 15, 2009) (proposed negotiating text referring to the rights of indigenous peoples in
the context of REDD).
114 Adaptation Fund. http://afboard.org/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2009): see generally Kyoto
Protocol, supra note 33, art. 12 (defining a clear development mechanism).
115 Third African Ministerial Conference on Financing for Development, Climate
Change, Kigali. Rwanda, May 21-22. 2009. Adaptation Financing Instruments, at 1
(prepared by
Richard
J.T.
Klein
&
Benito
Mtiller)
available at
http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/KigaliPolicyBrief3.pdf.
116 See, e.g., OHCHR Report, supra note 3, at 9.
117 See, e.g, id at 14.
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victims of Hurricane Katrina, for example, would stand higher in the
queue for adaptation funds than would those whose vacation homes in
Miami Beach are threatened by coastal sea level rise. The same
prioritization can be made based on the obligations to fulfill the right
to food or water; fundamental human needs should be met first in
implementing adaptation strategies or expending adaptation funds.
Central to effective adaptation is also the socio-economic capacity
of the affected sectors of society. Sectors of society that have more
resources, education, information, and wealth will be better able to
adapt to climate-related disruptions than will disadvantaged or
vulnerable groups.
Effective adaptation policies thus require
sensitivity to power imbalances in society. As the IPCC concluded
with respect to gender disparities:
Empirical research has shown that entitlements to elements of
adaptive capacity are socially differentiated along the lines of age,
ethnicity, class, religion and gender. Climate change therefore has
gender-specific implications in terms of both vulnerability and
adaptive capacity. There are structural differences between men
and women through, for example, gender-specific roles in society,
work and domestic life. These differences affect the vulnerability
and capacity of women and men to adapt to climate change. 118
What the IPCC concludes regarding gender is also true of other
vulnerable groups, including the very poor and indigenous peoples.
For adaptation policies to be effective, they must not reinforce
differential levels of vulnerabilities between gender, race, or class.
This also suggests that adaptive strategies should not only be reactive
in response to climate disruption, but should entail proactive capacitybuilding aimed at lifting the education, health, and wealth of the
poorest and most vulnerable sectors of society. Put another way,
efforts aimed at fulfilling related economic, social, and cultural rights
will also improve the adaptive capacity of a country and its effective
implementation of adaptation strategies.
CONCLUSION

For many environmentalists, the human rights system offers the
promise of a robust set of principles attached to quasi-judicial bodies
that offer the hope of enforcing these legal principles against a State.
This is a significantly different approach than the complex
management systems created to address environmental issues under
118

JPCC2007: Adaptation and Vulnerability, supranote 84,

at 730 (citations omitted).
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the existing climate change regime. International environmental law
lacks a general framework of legally binding principles that could
provide a clear framework for adjudicating relative rights and
responsibilities in the case of a global environmental problem such as
climate change.
Although the legal and moral weight of human rights tempts
climate advocates, the overall approach of human rights-placing
responsibilities on governments for the respect and promotion of its
citizens' absolute human rights-may not be a perfect match for
addressing the complexity of an issue like climate change. A rightsbased approach implies that some positions or interests cannot easily
be compromised.' 9 Taking these rights seriously would require more
international focus on issues of liability, legal responsibility, and
compensation-issues thus far generally ignored in the climate
negotiations, but ones that should increase in importance as climate
impacts worsen and the number of identifiable climate victims
increase.
Regardless of the long-term success of the legal claims or
obligations implicated by taking a human rights-based approach to
climate change, the rights-based discourse is already having
observable, positive impacts on international climate policies. Today,
the human rights perspective acts as a counterweight to the
technocratic approach of the carbon accountants, primarily focused on
ensuring that we measure greenhouse reductions accurately and take
the widest possible range of options for greenhouse gas reductions.
Basic to this approach is a focus on the carbon market where technical
questions of cost-effectiveness, additionality, and leakage dominate
the discourse. 12
A rights-based approach challenges the narrow
perspective of the carbon accountants and marketeers.
It is not that the carbon accountants and marketeers are wrong, but
simply that they have tunnel vision in their approach to climate
change mitigation and little background for addressing issues of
adaptation. Human rights advocates and climate change victims bring
different expertise and a different way of thinking about climate
change. Including rights-based institutions and voices in the climate
debate will ultimately lead to greater cooperation and policy
coherence between climate change and human rights. Thus, for
example, mitigation approaches based on biofuels and REDD may
119 See Sachs, supra note 9.
120 For a general discussion of issues surrounding the carbon market, see
HUNTER & POWERS, supra note 2.
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look promising to the carbon accountants and marketeers, but may
fall short when viewed through the lens of human rights. Similarly,
the carbon accountants and marketeers bring little expertise relevant
to prioritizing among a wide range of adaptation needs. Here, too, the
rights-based approach brings perspective and expertise that holds the
promise of setting adaptation priorities in a way that meets the twin
goals of reducing climate change impacts while progressively
fulfilling economic, social, and cultural rights.

